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Development of public policy is a key role of government. While there is a framework for 
Australian governments to uphold when developing public policy, this alone will not guarantee 
good policy development. This research critically explores the policy development process of the 
Department of Mines and Petroleum in Western Australia for mine closure and rehabilitation 
securities reform, where significant costs for mining companies, and large environmental and 
community legacies were at stake. Fundamental change from use of individual bonds to a central 
Mining Rehabilitation Fund resulted; offering financial advantage for mining companies and 
government alike, and a mechanism for rehabilitation of legacy abandoned mines. Critical 
elements in the policy development process were: (1) openness in clearly articulating the policy 
problem at the outset, (2) retaining focus on the policy scope relevant to jurisdictional level, (3) 
use of trusted experts especially for contentious aspects of the reform agenda, (4) commitment to 
stakeholder engagement throughout, and (5) acknowledging and managing uncertainties through 
transparent and consultative data gathering processes. Attention to these matters enabled an 
innovative and effective mine closure and rehabilitation policy solution to be implemented by the 
Government of Western Australia that is unique in the Australia, and perhaps the world.  
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Introduction 
Poor or inefficient policy making can result in unnecessary costs being borne by the community or 
industry, unnecessary adverse impacts on the environment, community, or economy, and lost 
opportunities. Public policy is essentially meaningless without implementation, and the scope of 
public policy is dimensionally related to the issue, circumstances, and environment of the relevant 
government.  
 
This research considers the role of local policymaking regarding consensus and the selection of policy 
solutions within the limited capacity of institutions to select policy alternatives (cf. Lui et al. 2009). 
By building on Beem’s (2009) discussion of bureaucratic autonomy in relation to the major policy 
change, we examine a major reform of domestic mining securities in Western Australia (WA) 
between 2008 and 2014. Details of the process followed and policy changes are detailed. In short, the 
key policy change was a shift from unconditional performance bonds (UPBs;  which are a globally-
common mining security mechanism in the form of bank guarantees that approximates the cost of 
environmental rehabilitation for each mineral tenement being paid by a mining company), to a central 
Mining Rehabilitation Fund (MRF). Rather than advocating a prescriptive policy approach, a key 
element was retaining focus on the policy problem at hand and building political support and 
consensus through trust between the administering Department of Mines and Petroleum (DMP) and 
industry and other stakeholders. Engaging known and trusted external experts in relation to 
developing policy innovation in complex and contentious spheres with high financial risk was also 
central to the adopted approach. A major complicating factor was the lack of empirical data of the 
eventual fiscal impact of a range of options; including the eventually-selected global-first in terms of 
the mining closure and rehabilitation.  
 
The aim of this article is to identify aspects of the policy approach adopted by the DMP that appear to 
have been critical to the success of the mine closure and rehabilitation securities policy reform, and 
explore what was unique in the policy development process. Our research findings may be of interest 
to professionals interested in innovative approaches for premature closure and abandonment of mine 




contextualising the WA mine closure and rehabilitation securities reform in relation to public policy 
making guidance from the literature and Australian government practice. We then explain the policy 
reform process with respect to environmental mining securities in WA that led to establishment of the 
MRF, along with reflections on the critical elements that contributed to successful development of this 
public policy.  
 
 
Public policy making 
 
The obvious policy solution available to the DMP would have been to modify the existing 
arrangements for UPBs already in place. The aim of UPBs is to make the financial risk to the State 
Government of the private mining operation negligible. However, in practice the value of UPBs tends 
to be less (sometimes much less) than the actual cost of mine site rehabilitation if the company were 
to be unable to pay as a result of financial troubles. The Office of the Auditor General (2011) reported 
that the WA government was found to be exposed to significant financial risk arising from inadequate 
rehabilitation of closed mine sites, with the bonds in operation in 2011 covering less than 25% of the 
predicted cost of rehabilitation for any given site. While ‘obvious’, the policy reform solution to 
simply increase the UPB amount to cover at least 100% of the potential tenement liability would have 
created large direct and indirect costs for companies. Further, the large upfront nature of payment is a 
major barrier to new investments from small and medium companies, and do not solve the problem of 
historical abandoned mine-sites, or provide a solution for any impact outside the tenement. We 
believe that pursuit of the obvious policy solution would have resulted in policy failure. The 
willingness of the DMP to be open to alternative ideas from stakeholders and to take a fresh approach 
to public policy making was an important starting point to realise an ultimately innovative solution to 
mining security exposure, which has now been suggested for adoption in other national and 
international jurisdictions (O’Kane 2014; Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 2014). 
 
Even in the well-regarded literature, there remains ambiguity regarding the definition of ‘public 
policy’ (Althaus et al. 2007). There are various forms of policies generated by governments, 
including: political policies (communicated by political parties usually before elections), 
administrative policies (relating to specific operational issues), statutory policies (formally provided 
for in legislation), and public policies (formally adopted, usually at senior levels of government, on 
the intent, opinion, and/or objective of government regarding a certain issue). The focus of this 
research is on public policy. There has been specific research undertaken on processes and issues 
relating to the evaluation of public policies (Gunningham & Grabosky 1998). A recurring theme in 
policy analysis is that the process of developing public policy is critically important in determining 
whether the policy (and implementation) is ultimately successful. In response, governments 
throughout Australia have adopted several processes to improve the rigour of policy development 
within their agencies. These include: 
• establishing centralised support - various jurisdictions have developed centralised policy 
development expertise (e.g., the Australian Government has established the Office of Best 
Practice Regulation); 
• standardising processes - many jurisdictions have some form of compulsory regulator impact 
assessment for significant policies/legislation; 
• building capacity in government - many organisations aim to build policy development capacity 
within government (e.g., the Australian New Zealand School of Governance, ANZSOG); 
• jurisdictional reviews - many jurisdictions have processes to reassess agency service delivery and 
alignment of government policies (e.g., efficiency reviews by State Auditors General). 
 
These processes are in addition to the policy rigour that may result from Government and 
Parliamentary processes (especially in the consideration of legislation). They are generally formalised 
processes, and reflect the desire by governments to have more effective policies developed. 
In practice, it is important for public policy development to remain a pragmatic and flexible process, 




emerging issues, regulatory paradigms, capacity constraints, political dynamics, and community 
demands (Fox et al. 1998; Curran 2015). The Australian Policy Handbook (Althaus et al. 2007) is a 
comprehensive and pragmatic public policy framework for the Australian States and Territories. The 
framework generally includes the stages of problem definition, options analysis, identification of 
preferred option, development of implementation strategy, and then implementation and evaluation. It 
is intended that the communication and engagement of stakeholders occurs across these stages. In the 
analysis that follows, we document those aspects of the policy reform approach by DMP that appear 
to have been critical to the success of the policy, and what was different from the process compared 
with the usual policy development processes.  
 
 
Policy reform of environmental mining securities in Western Australia 
 
Environmental mining securities are one of the regulatory mechanisms employed by governments 
around the world that provide confidence to both the government and the community that satisfactory 
mine rehabilitation and closure will be achieved. The main aim of environmental mining securities is 
to ensure that sufficient funds are available for government to rehabilitate mine sites in the event of 
operators not fulfilling their mine rehabilitation and closure obligations. In the late 1980s, 
environmental mining securities were introduced into WA through amendments to the principal 
governing legislation, the Mining Act 1978. The form of environmental mining securities adopted by 
WA was primarily UPBs in the form of bank guarantees. The UPBs operated through the DMP as the 
administering agency, which determined the required value of the UPB, and requiring the company to 
supply a UPB to that value. The form of the UPB is a contract between a financial institution of 
appropriate standing and the Minister for Mines, which essentially provides for the financial 
institution agreeing to pay the Minister for Mines the value of the UPB if the Minister demands it at 
any time. If the Minister demands the payment from the financial institution, it is then up to the 
financial institution to seek recovery of costs from the mining operator. This is the usual way that 
UPBs operate throughout the industry. 
 
When environmental mining securities were introduced in the late 1980s, it was intended that the 
value of the UPB for each mineral tenement fully covered the costs of environmental rehabilitation. 
This approach meant that the WA government’s financial risk for each site was almost negligible. By 
2012, there were nearly 5,000 tenements with a form of UPB out of a total of more than 23,000 live 
mining tenements in WA; a major global mineral-intensive jurisdiction. For a variety of reasons, 
including the workload required to review the value of all UPBs in a timely fashion, the value of 
UPBs for each tenement did not keep pace with the actual costs of mine site rehabilitation. This meant 
that while the aggregate value of UPBs were around AUD1 billion by 2012, it was estimated that on 
average this represented less than 25% of the total cost of mine site rehabilitation across WA1.  
 
The problem that this presented was that in the event that a mine site became abandoned, and the 
government ‘exercised’ the UPB (demanded payment from the relevant financial institution), around 
75% of the cost of rehabilitating the mine site would have to be met by the government through 
consolidated revenue. For this reason no money had been spent by DMP on on-ground rehabilitation 
of abandoned mines in WA for more than a decade. This was recognised as an untenable position by 
the WA government. In 2008, a review of environmental mining securities was conducted by the 
Department of Industry and Resources (now the Department of Mines and Petroleum, DMP). The 
recommendation was the retention of the UPBs as the most suitable financial instrument for mining 
securities in WA, and that UPB rates should be steadily increased to 100% of total rehabilitation and 
mine closure costs, and be phased in over a period of six years. In adopting this recommendation, the 
first stage of bond increases was enacted in 2008. However, in December 2008, the Minister for 
Mines (‘the Minister’), in consideration of the impact of the global financial crisis, set a moratorium 
on the further implementation of the recommendation of phased increases in UPBs rates until the end 
                                                          
1 DMP estimated the total mine rehabilitation and closure costs for all mines operating under the 




of December 2010. The resulting tension for the government was that the UPBs were of such low 
levels that they could not be effectively used as to rehabilitate abandoned mine sites. However, the 
economic environment meant that mine sites were already suffering financial stress, which would be 
exacerbated by UPBs even at a fraction of the total rehabilitation cost. 
 
 
The Mining Rehabilitation Fund (MRF) Act 2012 
 
As a consequence of the prevailing predicament, the DMP commenced a further review of the 
environmental mining securities system in 2009. The outcome of this process was a recommendation 
to discontinue the reliance on UPBs as the sole form of environmental mining securities.  
 
It is worth observing that the two separate policy reviews of mining securities in WA undertaken 
within a few years by the same portfolio, developed very different recommendations. This situation in 
itself raises the question as to why such different policy solutions were recommended. The scope of 
the review undertaken between 2006 and 2008 included investigating alternative financial models, 
and consideration of trust funds. However, it concluded that no working model could be found. It is 
the view of the authors that the different outcomes were, in this case, the result of one main factor: the 
change in policy inertia and the advantage taken by the WA government in response.  
 
As noted above, the UPBs are a common form of mining security, and had been applied in WA for 
more than twenty years. While it was recognised that the UPB approach had certain deficiencies, they 
did have the advantage of being well-understood by the industry and the government. Therefore, any 
policy reforms would tend to seek to modify the existing approach as the option of least cost, 
disruption and perceived risk. However, between the review published in 2008, and the review 
commenced in 2009, the financial implications of the GFC had become more pronounced on the WA 
economy. This emerging economic environment led to significantly increased costs to mining 
company operators to post UPBs. The short term costs of UPBs, and particularly full cost UPBs, was 
considerably greater by 2009 than had been the case between 2006 and 2008. It is the authors’ view 
that this situation was a ‘trigger’ for the WA Government to change the policy inertia that related to 
mining securities, and directly led to there being an increased interest in exploring structural changes 
to the UPBs. This observation in itself suggests that dealing with the inevitable policy inertia is an 
important early stage in the development of sound public policy. 
 
UPBs would be replaced with a centralised special government fund. Eventually the WA Parliament 
would pass the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012, establishing what would be known as the 
Mining Rehabilitation Fund (MRF). The MRF is a pooled fund, with revenue into the fund generated 
by contributions through annual, non-refundable compulsory industry levies upon tenement holders 
according to the environmental disturbance existing on a tenement. The MRF is a special purpose 
account in accordance with the Financial Management Act 2006, and is vested under the control of 
the Chief Executive of DMP. The interest generated from the money in the fund is not directed to 
consolidated revenue and remains within the MRF. The MRF Act 2012 specifically stipulates that 
money out of the fund can only be spent on certain activities; that the interest generated from the fund 
can be used by Chief Executive to pay for costs associated with administering the Act, and on any 
historical abandoned mine site. While the principal in the fund can be used on any mine site 
abandoned after the commencement of the MRF Act. The MRF is expected to receive at least AUD25 
million annually from levies, and the DMP estimate that the principal could grow to around AUD500 
million. 
 
The policy implemented in WA for environmental mining securities appears to be globally unique. 
The policy approach is receiving praise from industry (Cervantes et al. 2014), and is also receiving 
considerable attention from other Australian (O’Kane 2014; Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection 2014) and international jurisdictions (Morrison-Saunders 2014a; 20014b). The DMP have 
published the outcomes of detailed assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of the MRF 




• the financial risk to the WA government, and therefore the community, has been substantially 
reduced (see Office of the Auditor General, 2014) - the projected value of the fund and the 
annual revenue will enable any demands from mine site abandonment to be adequately 
addressed;  
• the costs to industry are substantially reduced - modelling undertaken by DMP has indicated that 
the direct and indirect costs of the MRF are approximately 10% of that of full cost UPBs; 
• a perpetual funding arrangement is in place for historical abandoned mines - almost all countries 
with an established mining industry have the challenge of mines that have been historically 
abandoned without being rehabilitated; the MRF provides a permanent funding source for 
abandoned mines which did not previously exist; 
• the level of publicly available information and data related to the environmental footprint of 
mining has been substantially improved - as a result of the implementation of the MRF, the DMP 
is publicly releasing each year the reported environmental footprint and areas under rehabilitation 
for all Mining Act 1978 tenements, which is the most comprehensive and current  mine data 
reporting ever achieved in WA. 
 
 
Overview of the DMP public policy reform process 
 
In accordance with the Australian Policy Handbook (Althaus et al. 2007), the DMP established a 
formalised industry liaison committee (the Mining Securities Industry Liaison Committee, MSILC) 
compromising representatives of the key mining industry associations, which convened on 16 
occasions. During the course of the reform process, DMP published and consulted on three 
documents. 
1. Issues paper (December 2010): within six months of formally commencing the review process, 
DMP published for public comment a “Preliminary Discussion Paper on Policy Options for 
Mining Securities in Western Australia”. This paper was a ‘green paper’ that described the 
context, policy problem, and the initial appraisal of possible solutions. A total of 19 submissions 
were received from industry, government and non-government organisations, and a response to 
comments was subsequently published by DMP.  
2. Preferred policy paper (March 2011): following the ongoing consultation and policy analysis, 
DMP released for public comment the “Western Australia’s Mining Security System: Preferred 
Option Paper”. This report was a ‘white paper’ that broadly described the conclusion of the 
policy analysis, and presented the centralised fund as the preferred approach. The report 
described the policy framework for the new mining securities fund (at that time called a fidelity 
fund, later to the called the Mining Rehabilitation Fund). A total of 13 submissions were received 
from industry, government and non-government organisations, and a response to comments was 
again published by the DMP (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011). This relatively low 
number and supportive nature of submissions, especially given the substantial proposed policy 
change, indicates that even by this stage, the WA government had obtained broad support from 
stakeholders. 
3. Draft legislation (July 2012): following the final policy analysis, and the necessary approvals by 
the Government, the draft legislation was prepared and public consultation was undertaken on 
the ‘exposure’ draft of the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Bill. Public consultation on draft 
regulations under that Act was also subsequently undertaken (February to April 2013).  
 
On 15 August 2012 the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Bill was introduced into Parliament, and on 5 
November 2012 the WA Parliament swiftly passed the Mining Rehabilitation Fund Act 2012, with 
regulations being gazetted on 21 June 20132.  
 
 
Discussion and analysis of the public policy reform process 
                                                          





There are a number of factors relating to the environmental mining securities issue that was 
particularly politically complex, including the likelihood of involving significant costs for mining 
companies, and that it related to environmental and community legacies regardless of the outcome. 
That the WA government adopted a significant policy change in this environment was unlikely, 
however, this is what transpired. The new MRF arrangements have addressed much of the 
environmental mining securities issues faced by WA. The legislation was supported by the industry 
sector, and within 12 months of commencement, the WA Auditor General confirmed the success of 
the policy and its implementation (Office of the Auditor General 2014). In our analysis of the policy 
reform process we have identified five critical aspects, which if otherwise managed, could have 
severely compromised the process and its passage into legislation. These are outlined below. 
 
1. Initial focus and engagement on problem definition 
It is the experience of the lead author that there are various reasons why government entities do not 
dedicate sufficient efforts to the identification of the problem that a government's public policy seeks 
to solve. These include where there is: (1) a predetermined desired solution, (2) a reluctance to 
quantify the extent of the problem for fear of attracting criticism, (3) a lack of agency capacity in 
policy development, or (4) policy inertia (a general desire to avoid dramatic changes in policy). The 
DMP did not have predetermined view of what model for environmental mining securities was the 
best for WA, and there was a significant contingent (and actual) financial liability facing the WA 
government that was described through the consultation process. The approach that DMP took in 
defining the policy problem, was to firstly articulate the principal objective of environmental mining 
securities, identify the principles that would describe an effective system (evaluating principles), and 
then describe the current situation against these objectives and principles. This was developed through 
stakeholder consultation. Early in the process, DMP confirmed that the purpose of environmental 
mining securities was: “To ensure that sufficient funds are immediately available to government to 
rehabilitate mine sites in the event of operators not fulfilling their mine rehabilitation and closure 
obligations”. The evaluating principles and the assessment of the policy options were subsequently 
published by DMP in the Preferred Options Paper (Department of Mines and Petroleum, 2011). It is 
the experience of the lead author that the identification of the policy problem was not straight-
forward, and the process of clarifying the principle objective of environmental mining securities 
uncovered different views within government, industry, and non-government. The process identified 
some surprising commentary from stakeholders. For example, some stakeholders believed that 
environmental mining securities were a form of penalty, while others believed that they had a broader 
application beyond environmental obligations. In addition, many stakeholders were unaware of the 
scale of the inadequacy on the UPBs at that time. Therefore, the legitimate openness and identification 
of the policy problem to all stakeholders was critical to the later delivery of appropriate policy 
solutions, by demonstrating the need for an honest analysis, evaluation and reconsideration of options 
(Riege & Lindsay 2006). 
 
2. Retaining focus on policy scope 
As noted by Beem (2009) and Liu (2010), the authors agree that the success in delivering the policy 
reform was significantly aided by keeping a keen focus on the domestic policy problem: an important 
element of building consensus was an active engagement at the local/domestic level rather than 
national or international jurisdictions. Throughout the consultation process, stakeholder contributions 
included aspects that were initially outside the scope of the reform. While some aspects were able to 
be incorporated into the reform (e.g., the issues relating to historical abandoned mines), the scope of 
the reform remained the key policy problem. Essentially, the DMP did not try to solve all of the 
various aspects relating to mineral and energy resources closure and decommissioning throughout 
WA. It is probable that if all aspects were attempted to be addressed, the environmental mining 
securities reform process would not have concluded, and the ability to partition aspects out of scope 
significantly assisted the delivery of the reform outcomes. As an illustration, through the process there 
were two recurring matters raised by stakeholders that were outside of the scope of regulatory capture 
under the environmental mining securities: (1)  the coverage of the petroleum activities, and (2) the 




regulated under State Agreement Acts and/or local government). Without dismissing these 
suggestions, the approach of DMP was to defer the policy approach for these issues recognising that 
concentrations of political power in these areas would likely engender a major influence difficult to 
manage in a relatively open and democratic process (Stiglitz 2002). Instead, the legislation was 
prepared to allow expansion to encompass State Agreement Act sites if later agreed to by the 
government, and committed to a separate process to investigate the issues relating to environmental 
petroleum securities. 
 
3. Use of trusted experts 
It is not uncommon for government agencies to engage external subject matter experts to assist in 
policy reforms. The DMP engaged various experts, and the authors suggest that there were two 
aspects critical to this engagement. Firstly, expertise was engaged for aspects of the reform process 
that were particularly contentious. This included modelling the financial impact of the various policy 
options (and the status quo), and assessment of outstanding mining rehabilitation liabilities across 
WA. Secondly, and considered to be more important, those experts were known to, and trusted by, 
stakeholders prior to their engagement by the DMP). Within the context of high levels of mistrust in 
political institutions at this time, it was clear that trust would be a key element in mitigating some of 
the potential for eroding the confidence of the key stakeholders in the policy reform (Banks 2014). 
The authors propose that this trust is the key element in the process, and is a fundamental component 
of the DMP garnering political leverage rather than engaging in the international policy arena per se, 
as described by Beem (2009).  
 
4. Commitment to the engagement process 
The authors believe that the commitment by the WA government to stakeholder engagement 
throughout the reform process was critical to its success, and without consultation and engagement it 
is unlikely that reform would have been delivered. An example is that the option of a fidelity fund 
(later defined as the Mining Rehabilitation Fund) was not originally suggested by DMP (Western 
Australian Parliamentary Debates 2012). Clearly then, had DMP simply sought to roll out its own 
original policy solution rather than be open to new ideas arising from stakeholders consulted, then the 
end result likely would have been policy failure. The active consultation and engagement to a genuine 
solution process included multilateral government briefings and engagements, industry forums, and 
regional 'road-shows'. Within this process, DMP delivered a commitment to formalised consultation at 
the three key stages of policy development (issue, options, preferred solution). At each stage there 
was also transparency to the stakeholder engagement (e.g., responses to submissions were published 
by DMP). 
 
5.  Uncertainties throughout the reform programme 
There were a number of uncertain aspects of assessment for which there was little empirical data (but 
considerable anecdotal information). One of these issues was the total contingent liability in WA. 
DMP published that the total mine rehabilitation and closure costs for all mines operating under the 
Mining Act 1978 in WA was estimated to be between AUD4 billion and AUD6 billion. This is a large 
range; however, DMP was clear in advising stakeholders that detailed data did not exist, as there was 
no requirement for mine sites to report estimated closure costs. While DMP undertook efforts to better 
determine the total mine closure and rehabilitation costs (e.g., engaging trusted experts to undertake 
selective audits), DMP determined that the large range was acceptable if this range was subsequently 
applied to determining the adequacy of the preferred model and the regulatory impact assessment. 
This aspect alone could have derailed the reform, although dealing with this uncertainty was assisted 
through stakeholders also understanding the data limitations. Another area of uncertainty was the 
quantification of direct and indirect financial impacts arising from the various environmental 
securities options being considered. This uncertainty arose as mining companies are not required to 
report (either publicly or to the DMP) the level of financial records that would enable detailed 
analysis to be undertaken. This was a critical issue as one of the key drivers for the policy reform 
process (and one of the evaluating principles) was the desire to minimise costs to operators. 





• consulted with industry on the model for estimating direct and indirect costs;  
• provided a downloadable macro for companies to undertake their own analysis of the impacts on 
their circumstances; and 
• offered that industry associations provide individual companies the option of assisting with 
modelling (when companies were reluctant to share financial information with the government). 
 
A further uncertainty was no predefined timeframe for conclusion of the policy reform process. This 
is considered unusual, as the importance of establishing clear stages and milestones for reform 
programmes to all stakeholders with clarity around expectations are generally considered important in 
policy reform processes (Althaus et al. 2007; Blackburn 2014). It is therefore of some interest that the 
environmental mining securities reform process did not have established milestones, yet was still 
successful, retained the broad support of stakeholders; and was relatively swift considering the scale 





Development of public policy is a necessary and vital role of government. Processes for doing so 
matter; especially in situations where high risk financial and environmental resources are at stake. 
Environmental mining securities are an issue across the world, and many jurisdictions have identified 
failings within their policies. In this article we analysed the mining securities policy reform approach 
recently adopted in WA to identify critical success factors in the public environmental policy making 
process. The broad steps of policy development used by DMP are consistent with the broad 
framework of international and national development; however, the process used by DMP was 
adapted to the situation, and to some may be considered unusual and potentially contentious. We 
believe the basic rationale is that adopting pragmatic ways of dealing with uncertainty is important in 
the policy reform process to ensure momentum is maintained. An example is the different options 
being considered by the DMP would have had different delivery timeframes, and the establishment of 
set timeframes at the process commencement was not realistic. As such, unusually the timeframes and 
milestones were not as important as building trust with stakeholders and retaining a commitment to 
the engagement process. The engagement of known and trusted external experts by DMP (external 
and trusted by both to the government and industry) was determined to be a key element to deal with 
contentious issues. An additional contentious issue was that there was little empirical data regarding 
the actual cost to industry and also of the liability to the WA government.  
 
The genuine desire by the WA government to define and address the problem at hand (rather than 
implement a predetermined solution or include aspects deemed to be important but out of scope), 
engendered considerable confidence in the public policy development process itself. As a result, 
several major outcomes were achieved, including: 
• the financial risk to the WA government and the cost to industry has been substantially reduced;  
• the amount paid into the MRF for each tenement is based on the disturbed area and condition 
which provides an incentive for continuous minimal site disturbance and maximum 
rehabilitation; 
• the existence of a perpetual fund for historical abandoned mine rehabilitation;  
• availability of funds to government to rehabilitate mine sites in the event of operators not 
fulfilling their mine rehabilitation and closure obligations; and, 
• an unprecedented level of publicly available information related to the environmental footprint of 
mining in WA (down to the level of each hectare disturbed, rehabilitated, and detailed 
conditions). 
 
The DMP’s public release of details of the MRF and the reported environmental footprint and areas 
under rehabilitation for all tenements in WA annually, provided confidence to both the government 
                                                          




and the community that satisfactory rehabilitation and closure is achieved. Overall the DMP example 
demonstrates the value of a contextually sensitive, adaptive, participatory, yet pragmatic approach to  
policy development that engages with stakeholders (without artificial policy delivery deadlines), using 
five principles that encapsulate the critical aspects outlined in the policy making process: (1) 
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